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NOTES

MPNERAL RiGs-EXTNSION OF PREScmmrION BY ExEcuTiON

LEAsE--Defendants' ancestor sold a tract of land to
plaintiff's assignor, reserving an undivided one-half of the mineral rights. Subsequently, defendants' ancestor and plaintiff
executed a joint mineral lease" in favor of one Cyr. The terms
of the lease extended some two years beyond the ten-year prescriptive period of the mineral servitude reserved by defendants'
ancestor. Plaintiff sues to cancel the servitude on the ground
that it had been lost by nonuser of ten years. Defendants plead
that plaintiff's joining their ancestor in executing a mineral lease
constituted an acknowledgment of their rights under the servitude which had the effect of interrupting prescription. Held,
prescription was not interrupted but was merely extended for
the duration of the lease. Acknowledgment will not interrupt
prescription of a mineral servitude unless it is clearly shown
that such was the result intended. Achee v. Caillouet, 1 So. (2d)
530 (La. 1941).
In the case of Frost-JohnsonLumber Company v. Nabors Oil
and Gas Company2 it was held that acknowledgment of the
rights of the owner of a mineral servitude interrupted the running of prescription. However, the rule has since developed that
a "mere acknowledgment" will not have that effect; a clear
showing of an intention that prescription be interrupted is now
required.8
. The question of the effect of a landowner's executing a
mineral lease jointly with his servitude owner was first presented to the court in Mulhern v. Hayne. There it was stated
that the landowner, by executing a joint lease which extended
beyond the prescriptive period of the servitude, acknowledged
the rights of his co-lessor which amounted to "an interruption
of the then accruing prescription." The language used in the
Mulhern case seemed to show quite clearly that by "interruption" the court meant interruption in its true sense-that is, that
prescription would commence to run anew.6 As the court pointed
OF A JoINT

1. On the original hearing the court found that there was no joint lease,
but on rehearing the lease was treated as having been executed jointly.
2. 149 La. 100, 88 So. 723 (1921).
8. Lewis v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 167 La. 1067, 120 So. 859 (1929); La Del
Oil Properties v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 La. 1137, 126 So. 684 (1930);
Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 185 La. 917, 171 So. 75 (1986); Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (1940). Daggett, Louisiana Mineral
Rights (1939) 38-52, c. 2, 1 14.
4. 171 La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
5. 171 La. at 1006, 182 So. at 660.
6. In the Muthers case the court cited Art. 3520, La. Civil Code of 1870,
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out in the present case, this view does not accord well with the
rule that the intention to interrupt prescription by the acknowledgment must be clear.7 Later decisions cast considerable doubt
upon the Mulhern case as authority for the proposition that a
landowner's joining the owner of mineral rights in a lease would
interrupt prescription. In Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil
Companys the court said of the Mulhern case: "Manifestly the
life of the servitude had to be extended to make the five-year
lease valid for that length of time." (Italics supplied.) In Hightower v. Maritzky9 there is found a further discussion of the
Mulhern case as involving an extension of the prescriptive
period. The holding of the court in the instant case definitely
settles the rule that an extension for the duration of the lease
rather than an interruption of prescription results when landowner and servitude owner join in the execution of a mineral
lease. The language in the Mulhern case to the effect that an
interruption of prescription would result was held to be mere
obiter dicta and not controlling;1" the court further pointed out
that if the Mulhern case did hold that interruption resulted from
a joint lease the decision had been repeatedly overruled by implication as being utterly inconsistent with the doctrine that in
order for an acknowledgment to have the effect of interrupting
prescription such interruption must have been clearly intended.
The decision in the present case appears to be unquestionably sound; it should be welcomed in that it clears up a troublesome problem and establishes a rule which gives more accurate
effect to the obvious intentions of the parties. 1
K.J.B.
and quoted with approval the following language from Nabors Oil and Gas
Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co.: "'The period of prescription may be interrupted by a written acknowledgment on the part of the obligor; but, when
so interrupted, it begins anew from the date of the acknowledgment.'" 171
La. at 1006, 132 So. at 661.
7. See authorities cited in note 3, supra.
8. 185 La. 917, 923, 171 So. 75, 77 (1936). In the Bremer case the joint
lease did not extend beyond the prescriptive period of the servitude. The
court held that there was no intention to interrupt prescription shown and
that consequently the mere acknowledgment would not have that effect.
Although this case expressly reaffirmed the holding in the Mulhern case,
the two cases seem irreconcilable in principle.
9. 194 La. 998, 1009-1010, 195 So. 518, 521 (1940), noted in (1940) 2 LouwINA
LAw Rvmuw 755.
10. The court reasoned that it was not necessary to find an interruption
in the Mulhern case since the lease was still in existence and the servitude
thereby kept alive by extension.
11. It would be interesting to see what disposition the court would
make of the rights of a minor succeeding to the rights of the servitude
owner in the extended period. Would the running of prescription be sui-

pended?

